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ARMS EXPORT CONTROL: TOUCHING THE CLOSED SUBJECT
14 July 2001
As everybody knows after Winston Churchill, democracy is a very inconvenient system. It requires too much. For instance, it requires transparency. Of everything and for
everyone. And while interference of the state into private life of citizens is limited, citizens want to know about the state almost everything. Among the issues of permanent
interest, arms trade ranks among the most “sensitive”.
Democracy advances, and arms trade more and more deals not only with profit but also with home and foreign policy. This was demonstrated throughout the modern history,
starting from the US President R. Reagan, who had problems with arms deliveries to Iran in ‘80s and finishing with the recent arrest of former Argentinean President C. Menem
accused of violation of the UN embargo on arms deliveries to Croatia in ‘90s.
They say, politics is the art of the possible. Is it possible today not to produce arms, and, if your country is called Ukraine, not to sell them? The answer is no. Having inherited
from the USSR a great deal of its military-industrial complex with millions of jobs, technologies and scientific schools, with established markets... — to give up trading? Another
thing is how to do that. The state prefers incurious citizens, especially in sensitive issues. This position of the state is understandable. While there is a military threat, there is an
army and the military-industrial complex — consequently, there is a stamp “classified” conveniently covering arms trade. On the other hand, however, if everything is secret but
trade exists in the form of well-known exchange of goods for money, there are tempting opportunities, at least theoretical, for abuses.
Hence, a problem arises: to make things public and avoid abuses, or to keep them covert and avoid leakage of secret information? The truth, as usually, lies in between the two
options and is confined to the degree or, so to speak, the balance of publicity.
On June 20, 2001, the Rus hotel hosted Round-table “The Development of Export Control System in Ukraine in the Context of Regional Security” organised by Ukrainian Centre for
Economic and Political Studies named after Olexander Razumkov (UCEPS) jointly with the Freedom House Ukraine Office. Almost 150 panellists representing concerned institutions
discussed problem issues in the sphere of arms export control in Ukraine and relevant experience of the EU countries. 75 experts from among the Round-table participants kindly
answered an anonymous questionnaire. The results of the poll are presented below.
The reader will probably find it interesting to familiarise himself with some thoughts and conclusions drawn by the results of the Round-table. Maybe they will be interesting for
the members of Ukraine’s National Security and Defence Council preparing future meetings.
Export control in Ukraine: not bad, but... something goes wrong all the time
The forthcoming 10th anniversary of independence unwittingly prompts comparison between what we used to have and what we have now. We propose comparing the volumes
of arms (Table “Arms reduction”). As we might see, the difference between what we had at the time of declaration of independence and what is in hand is significant. To be sure,
not all that equipment was exported — some was written off and scrapped or cannibalised, and exports in those years were made up not only of sold out items but also of new
armaments and services. However, the volumes are impressive, moreover that the range of sold arms and military hardware far exceeds the scope covered by the Table. There
were significant stockpiles of spare parts, too.
Exporting began almost immediately, in 1992, and in the beginning export control was far from perfect; sellers were many, and experts keep arguing how much was sold — worth
$25 million, or $400 million, or more. To tell the truth, as soon as the following year the state control system was substantially improved, Ukraine began to join international export
control regimes, our law-enforcement bodies learned to work tougher with potential smugglers, and in 1993-1996, arms exports fell to $50-200 million a year. Later, a system
appeared: special structures were created, experts employed, rules adopted, Americans rendered assistance (almost $14 million were granted for strengthening export controls),
finally, national arms programmes got on track.
In 1997-2000, arms exports hit the $450-600 million mark, half of that amount falling on domestic production. The revenues from arms exports over 10 years totalled some $3
billion (critics say, $32 billion). However, this year, a slight decline is expected — either the stock became exhausted or industry skids because of chronic underfunding of the
military-industrial complex. In a word, there are gains and losses, but Ukraine finally acquired the name of a strong exporter of arms among customers and competitors.
However, exact data of the recipients, quantities, prices and ways of arms exports remain sealed, competitors are on the alert, and customers are not always talkative. Hence, the
next apt illustration was borrowed from the UN Web-site (Table “The UN register of conventional arms for Ukraine”), where Ukraine annually reports on the main export items.
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To tell the truth, the Table gives only a general outline — it does not deal with exports of small arms presently so closely monitored by champions of peace, technologies (including
of dual use) and services. Besides, the data is presented on a Web-site of the UN, not of our native Ukrainian ministries and agencies.
Well, not all at a time. We do remember the times when the defence budget and even the places of location of military units were great secrets. A substantial path towards
publicity is behind. However, problems exist with the image of a decent exporter observing international norms and rules of arms export. Both at home and abroad, Ukraine is
regularly accused of violation or “improvidence” (when formally we are out of suspicion but arms come to a wrong place anyway). Sometimes we are even accused of illegal
export of rocket technologies, for instance, to Iraq. Representatives of the executive branch similarly regularly deny those allegations.
What strikes the eye is that accusations of Ukraine the most frequently appear in the media of its main strategic partners — Russia and the U.S. While earlier, alleged deliveries to
the Afghan Talibs and former Yugoslavia aroused concern, now the accusers are mainly preoccupied with Africa. It is noteworthy that accusations often strikingly concur with the
decisive stage of negotiations between Ukrainian exporters and potential customers.
The situation with Russia is more or less clear — in fact, we work on the same markets. And the talk with competitors, especially — former compatriots, is short. They may be
accused of dumping, transits via Ukrainian ports may be concealed, joint projects may be decently called just Russian, and Ukrainian — beknaved.
And when a Russian missile or aeroplane falls down, Russian investigators surprisingly often find the reason in components manufactured in Ukraine.
We compete with the U.S., too, especially on the markets of transport aviation and space launches, but there, the situation is more difficult: after all, that is a bulwark of
democracy, and criticism is heard not only from officials but also from many independent experts who just dislike our weapons appearing in the vicinity of “hot points”, where
people are killed indiscriminately and in quantities.
As for the rest, the loudest accusations are heard from Armenia, naturally concerned with anything moving from Ukraine in the direction of the South Caucasus.
At the UCEPS Round-table its participants acting in the framework of, so to speak, reasonable publicity, tried to touch the spot of the processes taking place within Ukraine’s
export control system and discuss the opportune ways of its further development.
It appears that the issues of arms export-import are regimented only by presidential and governmental acts. There is no basic law regimenting legal relations in that important
domain. Therefore, there is no parliamentary control of arms trade in Ukraine. Ukrainian experts believe that this causes instability of the export control system. Indeed, what
stability may be spoken about, when pursuant to the law, the Chairman of the Verkhovna Rada may familiarise even with the sanctum sanctorum — reports of intelligence bodies,
but not with information about arms exports…
Public control of this sensitive sphere is actually absent either. Even summarised information the Ukrainian Government transfers to international organisations within the
framework of international control regimes is hardly accessible for Ukrainian specialists and journalists. In such a situation one cannot rule out violations and abuses involving
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It was pointed out that numerous management and control bodies had been created in Ukraine, but in the sphere of arms trade all of them belong to the executive branch.
Meanwhile, the structure of export control available to the executive branch needs to be improved.
Many dislike that the State Export Control Service of Ukraine falls under the Ministry of Economy of Ukraine, instead of operating as a separate agency with a special status. A
superfluous link in the chain of export control system evidently slows down the process of prompt decision-making and does not improve its quality.
The recent accusations of Ukraine prove that the attitude to us outside the country in export control issues actually remains the same. After the Round-table, there was a series
of revelatory publications… The Washington Post (June 22) wrote in an article “Ukraine’s Arms Deals” referring to a UN source: “Ukraine demonstrates neither restraint nor due
care or diligence in its arms trade operations, which leads to situations where Ukraine serves as the starting point for illegal arms trade”. And literally this week (July 9) The
Guardian of Great Britain burst out with an article “The International Dealers in Death” telling about the adventures of a certain Minin allegedly making good money using his ties
in Ukraine. According to Italian magistrates, a few weeks before his arrest (in Italy — Author’s note), “Minin chartered an Antonov-124 transport aircraft in Moscow, had it flown to
Kyiv in Ukraine where it was loaded with 113 tons of Kalashnikovs, RPGs, and ammunition, and then directed it to Abidjan, the capital of Ivory Coast in west Africa”, The Guardian
reads.
Therefore, many experts argue that over the years of independence, a system of export control has been established in Ukraine, and today we may already speak about reliable
control of the executive branch over that sphere. Meanwhile, accusations of violation of international norms of arms trade regularly made against Ukraine in the Ukrainian and
foreign media and criticism on the part of the Verkhovna Rada clearly point to the shortcomings of the export control, at least, regarding proper information support for and
transparency of that process.
And how are the things with them, or what to expect in Europe?
In the community of civilised nations we are set to join, the situation with publicity/non-publicity of arms export look differently, but the steady trend towards publicity clearly
prevails. This is attriburable not only to the above-mentioned principles of democracy and prevention of abuses but also to globalisation not yet fully comprehensible for us.
Its essence lies in unification of the interests of countries of entire regions, including in the sphere of economy (arms production), military security (arms trade) and universal
steady development (regional stability). In such a situation appeals for national interests are losing weight but are still used as the traditional last argument in support for the
stamp “classified”.
At the same time, experts cite another explanation of the thirst for closeness: governmental officials and sometimes — politicians are trying to conceal information from the public
in order to obtain exceptional control over policy-making. And the greatest efforts are made when some dubious actions fraught with public disapproval need to be concealed.
According to EU experts, search of immediate commercial benefits from the sale of arms leads to negligence of human rights, regional security and steady development. Hence,
the EU countries are raising the curtain of secrecy over their actions in sensitive spheres of international relations. At least three effective forms of implementation of the principles
of publicity in arms export have been worked out: publication of annual governmental reports of activity in that sphere; parliamentary debate on arms exports; analysis and
publication of summarised data of regional and global arms markets.
Belgium, Italy and Sweden publish annual reports of arms exports for years; some EU countries have just implemented such practice: over the past two years, accounting
mechanisms have been established in France, Germany, the Netherlands, Spain, Great Britain, Denmark. In particular, the arms export report of the German Government is to be
found in the Internet on the Web-side of the Ministry of Economy of FRG; the Ministry of Defence of Finland placed in the Internet two annual reports in the Finnish and English
languages. The EU Council of Ministers publishes a Summary Report of observance of the EU Code of Conduct for Arms Exports in course of a year.
The British Government report contains both general information about the export control policy and detailed data of licensing decisions. For each country — recipient of the British
arms, the quantity, types and cost of granted licences, the number of granted and denied licences by category of materiel and the figures on the basic systems of conventional
weapons and small arms are cited.
A high level of transparency is also provided by the Irish system: the Internet monthly publishes statistical data of the issue of dual-use produce export licences, specifying
quantities, dates and countries of destination. The Netherlands annual report is distinguished for detailed elaboration of denial of licences: it contains full description of goods for
which a licence was denied, the country of destination, recipient, end user, the reason for, date and number of denial.
Parliamentary debate. Discussion of specific issues in parliaments of the EU member states traditionally presents an important instrument of control and analysis of governmental
policy. Certainly, there are limitations in arms export control. At the same time, there are mechanisms of ensuring the balance between the requirements of transparency and
confidentiality. In particular, in Great Britain, a joint quadrilateral parliamentary committee has been established for the review of the annual governmental report of strategic
exports involving members of the defence, foreign affairs, international development, trade and industry committees. In the Netherlands, the Government confidentially informs
parliamentary defence committee of all planned sales of excessive stocks of arms. Upon notification, the committee presents to the government its comments regarding such sale.
Sweden’s Government consults a special body on export control issues — the Export Control Council made up of present and former parliament members. Although the Council’s
opinion is not binding, in practice, a unanimous disagreement of the Council always leads to denial of a licence.
Analysis and publication of summarised data of the world arms market. One of the institutions engaged into that process is the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute
(SIPRI) that since 1969 has been publishing a fundamental English-language manual — SIPRI Yearbook: Armaments, Disarmament and International Security. SIPRI holds the
status of an independent (non-governmental) research institution employing qualified experts from different countries. The unbiased assessments and forecasts of the Institute
imparted it the authority and attention of politicians, governments and experts from all over the world.
The laws and trends of the world politics and international relations revealed by SIPRI experts in the spheres of arms production and trade, arms control and disarmament, origins,
current and resolution of armed conflicts, averting threats to international security in its global and regional aspects provide the basis for balanced decisions dealing with the
priorities of the national foreign policy, development of defence industry, modernisation of the armed forces, participation in peacekeeping activity, arms production and trade.
Therefore, the SIPRI Yearbook presents a weighty contribution to transparency in the spheres that previously have been actually closed for the public. Since 1993, the publication
has been translated into the Russian language, since 2000 — into Chinese. At the Round-table UCEPS presented the first Ukrainian-language edition of the Yearbook.
UCEPS experts are sure that this will allow to make up for the lack of summarised information in Ukraine about contemporary processes in the sphere of international security,
promote introduction of norms and definitions accepted by the international community into scientific and public turnover, state documents and practical policy in Ukraine. Finally,
publication of the SIPRI Yearbook in the Ukrainian language is entirely in line with Ukraine’s course of integration into the European and world political, scientific and cultural
community.
By the way, according to the poll conducted during the Round-table meeting, experts spoke out in favour of further publication of the Yearbook. 99% of the polled see it expedient
to continue the UCEPS project. At that, experts propose distributing the Yearbook in the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine, concerned ministries and agencies (96%), Presidential
Administration, the National Security and Defence Council Staff (95%), the Verkhovna Rada (95%), among arms manufacturers (88%), scientific libraries (87%), intermediaries in
arms trade (81%), at military schools (81%), civilian higher educational establishments turning out specialists in international relations (80%), non-governmental analytical centres
(75%), leading media (53%), public libraries (39%) and, finally, all higher educational establishments of Ukraine (24%). According to expert estimates, the required circulation of
the Ukrainian edition should be 4,800 copies, on the average.
Co-operation with SIPRI (and with other authoritative international analytical structures) will allow minimising the above-mentioned accusations of Ukraine of alleged indecent
behaviour on the world arms market. By the way, the overwhelming majority of European governments is not ashamed of answering inquiries of international research
institutions. If we follow their example, there may be fewer ungrounded accusations and inadequate assessments like the one recently made by SIPRI regarding the share of
Ukraine’s GDP allocated to defence — 3.6%. In reality, our military may only dream of such volumes (it has long been below 1.5%), and uninformed foreign readers, having read
this, may think God knows what about our lust for peace.
And so far, unfortunately, foreign experts point to Ukraine (alongside with Russia) as a state opposing greater transparency within the framework of international control
mechanisms. Nevertheless, our Foreign Ministry remains optimistic and believes that there have been only temporary technical differences that may occur with respect to any
participant of international regimes. God grants be so, but the thought about the imperishability of the temporary worries. There is a feeling that the world turns round ever faster,
while we cannot keep up with it, probably willing to somehow outwit it and still more close the sphere of arms trade under the accompaniment of declarations about its greater
transparency. I wish I were mistaken but...
What to do?
In a situation where the existing system of arms trade in general and control of their export in particular (even if it suits the present actors) does not promise a substantial
increase in revenues in the near future and ever less meets the demands of democratic Europe so dreamed of by Ukraine, one should think faster. Elementary logic prompts:
since the main problems deal not as much with the effectiveness of the system in the “technical sense” as its closeness that provokes substantial external and internal problems,
one should primarily think about a more civilised framework for access to information on the part of Parliament and social institutes. To respect not only the “sacred” interests of
the military-industrial complex but also the “curiosity” of the Verkhovna Rada, mass media, non-governmental centres, etc. It is natural to assume that such a sensitive sphere as
arms export control, from the point of view of its effectiveness, on the one hand, and publicity and controllability, on the other, should at least rest on a legislative base.
It should be noted that the governmental bill “On State Control of International Transfers of Goods Designated for Military Purposes and Dual-Use Goods” has been undergoing co-
ordination for years. At that, people’s deputies who took part in the discussion expressed doubt whether anybody in the Verkhovna Rada had seen the bill. This is no wonder,
since high-ranking officials already questioned the expediency of showing the “sensitive bill” to deputies who cannot cope even with regimentation of their own activity. I assume
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countries.
Meanwhile, it may already be stated that Ukraine’s authorities generally base their decisions in the field of arms exports on the criteria laid down by the EU Code of Conduct for
Arms Export. Probably, time has come to grant that EU document an appropriate status in the national legislation.
Article 4 of the draft Law of Ukraine “On State Control of International Transfers of Goods Designated for Military Purposes and Dual-Use Goods” defines “lawfulness, publicity and
accessibility of information on export control issues” as an important principle of Ukraine’s state policy in the sphere of export control. The Article should also specify the
mechanism of implementation of the principle of “publicity and accessibility of information”, for instance, through publication of annual governmental reports of arms exports, as is
the case in, say, the EU countries.
96% of the polled experts suggest that it is high time to create mechanisms of parliamentary control in the
sphere of arms trade, but they view forms of such control differently (Diagram “Do you see it expedient to
introduce mechanisms of parliamentary control in the sphere of arms trade in Ukraine?”). 29% suggests
that the Verkhovna Rada should have the right to obtain full information from the Government and hold
open hearings on export control issues. Another 35% agrees with the Verkhovna Rada right to obtain full
information from the Government on export control issues, but only on the condition of confidentiality. And
32% of experts believe that the Government should confidentiality grant limited information only to the
Verkhovna Rada committees for national security and defence and for international relations. Just 4% of
the polled do not support the idea of parliamentary control and believe that this will only lead to the leak of
information and political speculations.
Experts are more cautious about introduction of a system of civilian control of arms export (Diagram
“Should Ukraine introduce a system of broad public control in the sphere of arms trade on the part of
mass media, public organisations, non-governmental analytical centres?”). The majority of the polled (80%)
tend to believe that the Government should publish summarised information by the results of the year. Far
fewer experts (19%) believe that the Government should grant any information dealing with that sphere on
request of such institutes of civil society as mass media, public organisations, non-governmental analytical
centres. 13% of experts see it inexpedient to introduce a system of civilian control of arms export in
Ukraine.
The UCEPS experts believe that involvement of Ukrainian non-governmental analytical centres into research
in that sphere will help strengthen control of arms trade, prevent violations and abuses. As a result, more
effective civilian control will promote the positive image of our state and become another evidence of civil
society consolidation in Ukraine.
The specialists who took part in the poll generally agreed with the opinion of UCEPS experts and positively
viewed the possibility of strengthening the role of non-governmental research organisations in arms trade
control. 57% of them believe that this would help fight corruption and improve Ukraine’s international
image. 56% of the polled agree that this would allow attracting the intellectual potential of non-
governmental organisations and trade more effectively. 20% of experts believe that this will lead only to
the leak of information and political speculations.
Experts support issue of the annual governmental report on arms exports. 48% of the polled believe that
the report should contain only the general information, 37% — that the report should be elaborate and
covered in the press. 11% of experts suggest that the report should be drawn only for the Verkhovna Rada
on the condition of confidentiality. At that, two thirds of specialists (69%) are sure that Ukraine in its
decision-making process is already guided by the criteria of the EU Code of Conduct for Arms Export.
By and large, the results of the Round-table discussion have convincingly demonstrated that the problem of
insufficient publicity (or excessive closeness) in the sphere of arms export control exists. It needs to be
resolved, otherwise its effectiveness will be affected. We have gained some experience, have a strategic
course — so, we should act promptly, not wait until someone stirs us up.
Some general conclusions
Proceeding from the experience of the previous years, today, attention should be paid to the factors that
determine the effectiveness of export control in Ukraine. This primarily refers to one of the most complex problems, specifically, the search of an optimal balance between the
closeness of the sensitive sector of arms exports and its transparency for legislators, experts, public organisations, mass media, broad public.
Proceeding from the experience of informing the public about export of arms in other countries, it may be predicted with surety that in the event of preservation of closeness of
that sphere, accusations of Ukraine will continue.
Ukraine’s authorities have got used to deny reports and make excuses, but those efforts prove not very effective — accusations continue, and one of the reasons for that lies
exactly in the closeness. Wouldn’t it be better to follow the advice of many independent experts and entrust the task of supporting the national image, on the condition of proper
transparency, to domestic journalists and public organisations? After all, excessive difficulty in the media getting information not only arouses suspicion but facilitates conduct of
special information operations against Ukraine.
It is time to think... Not only profit is endangered but something more important — the authority of the state, let alone the European choice.
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